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THE TR ANSFORMATION OF THE ISR AEL
DEFENSE FORCES
Avi Jager

O

ver the past decade, Israel’s military—the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)—has
enacted major changes to its structure and war-fighting priorities. Infantry, armor, and artillery forces have been reduced and ordered to implement structural and
doctrinal changes to make them more relevant to anticipated future conflicts against
Hamas and Hezbollah. Naval and air forces expanded their unconventional capacities at the expense of their conventional-warfare capabilities. Equally important,
while Israel has allocated vast resources toward strengthening its defensive formations, the IDF has prioritized expanding cyber and intelligence units above all others.
The driving forces behind these changes were the rise of nonstate adversaries,
the declining threat from neighboring nation-states, and groundbreaking innovations in military technology. The implications of this transformation for Israel’s
security and military preparedness are potentially severe. Hamas and Hezbollah
have kept developing new ways to challenge Israel actively, which has responded
principally by developing defensive measures to protect against these new threats
rather than engaging with the sources of those threats offensively. Nonetheless,
contending with the existential threats Israeli security experts foresee on the
horizon—a multifront war with hundreds of thousands of missiles and rockets
targeting Israeli population centers—could require deploying ground forces to
capture areas in the Gaza Strip, southern Lebanon, Syria, and perhaps even Iraq
and Iran. Since the IDF ground forces have been reduced, deprioritized, and
neglected, they will encounter much greater difficulty achieving those objectives.
This article uses interviews with IDF intelligence analysts, security researchers, and past and present defense ministry personnel to present a comprehensive
survey of these changes and reforms across the IDF, their sources, and their
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operational implications. Among the interviewees were the alternate prime minister of Israel, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Benjamin (Benny) Gantz, former defense
minister and chief of general staff Lieutenant General (Ret.) Moshe Ya’alon, and
former IDF comptroller Major General (Ret.) Yitzhak Brick. In addition, ten
IDF intelligence analysts and commanders of varying ranks and specializations
were interviewed. The remaining data were collected from official publications
of government agencies, military publications, archival materials and protocols,
and over one thousand testimonies of IDF soldiers and reservists.
THE SOURCES OF IDF TRANSFORMATION
The primary reason for the IDF’s transformation was a deliberate decision by
Israel’s political and military leadership to strengthen the country’s defensive
formations, prioritize cyber and intelligence capabilities, and implement structural and methodological changes to make the IDF more relevant to future wars
with nonstate actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Benny Gantz, who currently
serves as Israel’s alternate prime minister and who led the IDF during this transformation period as chief of general staff, explained its rationale as follows:
[T]he purpose of [these changes] was to create a smaller yet deadlier army, capable of
confronting non-state adversaries in complex environments and on multiple fronts.
. . . The ability to be a smaller yet deadlier military depends primarily on the ability
to obtain accurate intelligence, process and analyze it effectively, and transfer it to the
combat forces in real time. . . .
I am saying, unambiguously, that I prioritized cyber and intelligence over infantry
and armor . . . [;] unlike the threat of ground invasion, the threat of cyber is realistic.1

Indeed, Israel’s political consensus is that the last conventional military threat
to Israel, the Syrian state, evaporated almost entirely during the civil war that
began there in 2011. Until then, Israel had considered a conventional war with
Syria to be a likely conflict scenario. Unlike Jordan and Egypt, Syria never signed
a peace agreement with Israel, nor did it establish any diplomatic or economic
relations. Syria confronted Israel directly in 1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982, and
continued to require mass conscription for its army. In 2011, the Arab Spring
spread to Syria and put the al-Assad regime on the cusp of extinction. The Syrian
armed forces suffered tremendous losses following the outbreak of the civil war,
from both casualties and defections. As a result, the regime lost territory and
sovereignty to such an extent that it had to rely on foreign support to preserve
its rule. Syria’s declining demographic and economic stability, combined with
its deteriorating military power, led Israel to judge that the al-Assad regime no
longer was a central threat to its national security, at least over the short term.2
The structural and doctrinal changes to the IDF were, by and large, the operational and organizational response to the gradual transformation of Hamas
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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and Hezbollah from local resistance movements into powerful militant organizations. Within twenty-five years, Hamas has transformed from a grassroots
socioreligious movement into a political regime with a military wing consisting
of over thirty thousand combatants and an arsenal of approximately twenty
thousand rockets capable of reaching targets two hundred kilometers away.3
Hezbollah has undergone an even greater organizational transformation, from
a grassroots political movement into what many experts consider to be the most
powerful nonstate military force in the world, with an estimated fifty to sixty
thousand fighters and more than a hundred thousand rockets.4 Hezbollah’s tactical skill set evolved drastically as a result of its experience in the Syrian civil
war and it now is capable of carrying out offensive attacks beyond Lebanon’s
borders and on Israel’s home front.5 Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s combat experience,
firepower, and confidence have elevated their status in the eyes of the Israeli
military leadership, which regards them as being among the primary military
threats to Israel’s security now.6
THE IDF’S NEW BATTLEGROUP FORMATION
In the summer of 2015, the IDF launched the Gideon multi-year plan (GMYP)
under General Gantz to shrink, modernize, and reform the Israeli military to
meet the asymmetric, nonstate adversary threats that now were prioritized
over its traditional state-on-state warfare mission. The IDF cut combat and
noncombat forces alike and across both active and reserve military formations.
The IDF standing army was instructed to cut 10 percent of the commissioned
and warrant officer posts and reduce their total number from 45,000 to 40,000
troops.7 The size of conscripted forces was reduced as well; the length of male
conscripted service was shortened by four months, and it is expected to be
reduced by an additional two months in the coming years.8 The reserve forces
were affected most by the GMYP, which suggested cutting 30 percent of the reserve army, which meant releasing one hundred thousand out of three hundred
thousand active reservists.9
Perhaps the most profound change suggested by the GMYP was the reorganization of the IDF’s combat formations. Since the founding of the IDF, the divisional formation had been the IDF’s core operational battle group.10 Following
the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the decline of conventional warfare and the rise of
nonstate adversaries led to an erosion of the divisional framework as the IDF’s
primary battle formation. As time went on, the IDF operated in smaller areas
of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and southern Lebanon that did not require, nor
could they accommodate, large task forces. The IDF’s missions no longer were
to occupy vast adversary-state territory but, instead, to gain operational control
over geographically limited hostile areas and eliminate localized threats such as
missile capabilities and arms-smuggling tunnels. The capabilities of the nonstate
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/4
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adversaries against which the IDF increasingly was being tasked—disorganized
militias in southern Lebanon and local Palestinian terrorist cells in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip—as advanced as they were, did not justify deploying entire
divisions. Furthermore, deploying large task forces could have resulted in more
casualties, more collateral damage, and ineffective use of the combat forces.
In 2011, the IDF began implementing a new operational doctrine that established brigades as independent battle groups instead of division-sized formations, each capable of planning and executing ground maneuvers without
divisional support.11 The new brigade battlegroup formation consisted of six
battalions, including infantry, armor, artillery, and combat-engineering forces.
In addition, each battalion now could communicate directly with the air force
and navy for exfiltration or
fire support. To allow better
The driving forces behind these changes were
control and coordination bethe rise of nonstate adversaries, the declining
tween the different battalions,
threat from neighboring nation-states, and
each brigade battle group was
groundbreaking innovations in military
given its own command-andtechnology.
control headquarters. These
headquarters were in continuous communication with other field forces, as well
as with parallel forces and the senior commander. Brigades were now responsible
for managing their own logistics, rearmament, and tactical extractions.12
The primary purpose of the new battlegroup formation was to create a fighting force that would be more relevant in future conflicts against Hezbollah
and Hamas. Israel expects its future conflicts will be characterized by dynamic
adversaries that constantly change their structure and methods, in addition to
acquiring new techniques and weaponry. The shift to smaller battle groups with
the combined capabilities of different corps and the ability independently to plan
and execute battle plans increases the IDF’s effectiveness and flexibility.13
In turn, this reform of the IDF’s primary fighting formations had profound impacts on the organization of the army branches and corps that contributed forces
to the new brigades.
Infantry
In recent years, the IDF reduced the size of its combat infantry forces and expanded the constabulary forces that guard Israel’s borders and the occupied
territories. In 2005, the IDF established a new infantry brigade to specialize in
those security missions, the Kfir Brigade. The Kfir Brigade was larger than most
combat infantry brigades; IDF infantry brigades usually consist of four battalions, whereas the Kfir Brigade consisted of five battalions. The brigade’s purpose
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was to maintain a permanent presence in the West Bank to perform routine security missions, protect the Israeli settlements, and prevent infiltration attempts
into Israel.14 Between 2004 and 2017, to perform border-protection and routine
security missions across Israel’s borders, the IDF established four more similar
battalions: the Caracal, Lions of the Jordan Valley, Cheetah (Bardelas), and Lion
of the Valley battalions.15
The IDF’s combat infantry units, after experiencing a significant reduction in
manpower following the decision to reduce the length of compulsory military
service, began focusing their training on combating guerrilla warfare and preparing for future conflicts against Hezbollah and Hamas. The basic training of IDF
infantry units is divided into two parts, general training and specialized training.
The IDF has not changed the general training style and requirements significantly
over the last several decades. The first part of the basic training is focused on fundamentals. These include preparing, using, and maintaining a personal rifle; walking long distances with heavy weight; team protocols such as battle formations
and movement; and military sign language and chain-of-command structures.
The second part of the basic training is conducted after the soldiers are assigned
to their individual specializations: squad leaders, advanced marksmen, machine
gunners, grenade gunners, shoulder-fired-missile operators, medics, or riflemen.
In this phase, they learn about the theory and practice of their respective roles and
undergo extensive training and tests to qualify as fully operationally proficient.16
In contrast, the specialized training of IDF infantry soldiers has seen substantial changes in response to Israel’s changing adversary priorities. In the past, the
specialized training focused on open-field warfare techniques. This included
individual, squad, platoon, and company open-field-warfare drills, focused on
capturing and holding strategic geographic positions to support seizing and
controlling large swaths of territory. Urban warfare was practiced only rarely
and underground warfare and fighting techniques in tunnels and underground
fortifications were excluded entirely from the training curriculum of standard
infantry units. The most basic principle regarding underground installations and
urban areas was simply to avoid them. However, from 2014 onward, the specialized training focused on urban warfare and introduced underground warfare as
a new concept with its own combat doctrine. Open-battlefield warfare practices,
such as occupying Syrian and Egyptian fortifications, were removed from specialized training programs.
Armored Corps
Historically, the two fundamental principles of the IDF armored corps were
mobility and speed; the underlying logic behind these principles was to leverage the armored corps’s unique movement capabilities to minimize its exposure
and vulnerability.17 The IDF exploited these capabilities to achieve decisive
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/4
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victories against conventional enemy forces. During the Suez crisis of 1956, the
38th Armored Division, led by Ariel Sharon, penetrated the armistice line with
Egypt along the Sinai Peninsula and captured the strategically crucial Abu-Ageila
military compound.18 During the Six-Day War of 1967, the IDF armored corps
bypassed Egyptian defensive lines on the southern front and captured the eastern
bank of the Suez Canal within two days.19 In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the
armored corps pushed Syrian forces to retreat from the Golan Heights and then
breached their lines to establish a forward offensive position only forty kilometers from Damascus.20 These conflicts all were characterized by open-battlefield
warfare, and the guiding principle on urban warfare at the time was to avoid it
unless it was essential to the mission.
Over the years, the battle space and adversaries shifted away from that traditional paradigm toward more-urban conflict environments, and the armored
corps’s role in subsequent operations diminished. The armored corps, like the
rest of the IDF, went from fighting open-field warfare against conventional
armies to conducting urban warfare against nonstate adversaries. In urban
warfare, armored units are unwieldy, less effective, and more vulnerable than in
rural environments. Urban defenders have inherent advantages; they can prepare
strong defensive formations and fortifications, lure their adversary into vulnerable positions, and move unexposed across infrastructure and populations. An
armored attacker, on the other hand, has limited ability to navigate, mobilize,
and communicate with other forces, especially as part of a diverse battle group.
The Lebanon war of 2006 illustrated armored units’ diminishing effectiveness
in urban and asymmetric warfare environments. During the first three weeks of
fighting, the armored corps and the rest of the IDF ground forces waited in staging areas while air forces engaged Hezbollah. When the ground invasion commenced, only two of four active armored brigades participated, using just 370 of
the estimated four thousand tanks in the Israeli inventory. The missions assigned
to armored units in Lebanon were also much different than in Israel’s previous
conflicts. Instead of penetrating deep into southern Lebanon, the armored corps
carried out raids against suspected Hezbollah compounds near the border. It
also engaged in routine security missions, such as patrolling an operational route
leading from Israel to southern Lebanon, performed rescue missions, and provided logistical support (e.g., transporting food, water, ammunition, and equipment to the other fighting forces).21
To remain relevant, the IDF armored corps significantly reduced its size and
changed its structure to adapt to Israel’s evolving security challenges. According
to former deputy chief of general staff Major General (Ret.) Yair Nave, more than
ten reserve brigades were eliminated over the last decade.22 Still more brigades are
expected to be phased out as the IDF continues to downsize its armored corps.
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In addition, instead of having four to six armored companies in each battalion
of the remaining tank brigades, they are being reorganized to have three tank
companies, two infantry companies, and one combat-engineering company.23
With this mix of forces, armored units now can operate independently as small
task forces, complete a wider variety of missions, and operate more effectively
in urban-warfare environments. These changes to the armored corps’s structure
and its integration into the new battlegroup formations made armored units
much more relevant and effective in Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE of 2014 than
they had been in other recent conflicts. The operation employed all four active
armored brigades for the first time in thirty-two years, and five hundred tanks
took part in the fighting. The armored corps suffered fourteen fatalities in the
operation, but all these were caused by mortar fire outside the Gaza Strip or by
sniper fire against personnel while outside their vehicle; no IDF tanks were destroyed or permanently incapacitated by enemy fire.24
Artillery
During the first decades of Israel’s existence, the official mission of the IDF artillery corps was to provide covering fire for the maneuvering forces. The artillery
corps played a key role in Israel’s armed conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s. In the
Six-Day War of 1967, the IDF artillery corps destroyed twenty-six of forty Syrian missile batteries and provided covering fire for the maneuvering IDF ground
forces, enabling them to capture the Syrian Golan Heights within two days of
fighting. In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the artillery corps divided its attention
between two fronts. The Drakon battalion was instrumental in blocking the Syrian armed forces from advancing in the north while the rest of the corps enabled
the IDF’s counterattack against the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai Peninsula.25
However, as with the fate of the IDF’s armored corps, the waning of conventional warfare reduced the artillery corps’s relevance in Israel’s modern conflicts.
Since the Yom Kippur War of 1973, no foreign military has attempted to invade
Israel and the IDF conducted multidivision ground maneuvers only once, during
the Lebanon war of 1982. More importantly, when IDF combat forces penetrated
hostile areas, battlefield conditions limited the ability of the artillery corps to
provide fire support. The large kill radius of artillery shells combined with their
inability to hit targets with sufficient precision increased the risk of friendly fire
or of excessive collateral damage, limiting artillery’s useful role in the conflict.
The artillery corps began reforming and reorganizing itself to address the
changing operational environment that the IDF faced by the time the second intifada began in 2000. In the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century,
Israeli military leadership established two new secretive units within the artillery
corps to address the mismatch between the corps’s traditional capabilities and
the needs of a more urban battlefield. Instead of artillery weapons, the new units
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/4

8

20

Jager: The Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

were equipped with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to conduct assault and
reconnaissance missions.
The assault UAV unit, called Zik or Unit 5252, operates the Israeli-made
Hermes 450 UAV. The Hermes 450 is a multirole, high-performance, tactical UAV capable of collecting intelligence, conducting electronic warfare, and
launching missiles.26 The main virtue of the Zik unit is its ability to use precisionguided munitions to launch surgical strikes, thus minimizing collateral damage
and threatening distant and hidden targets.
The reconnaissance UAV unit, called Sky Rider or Unit 5353, operates the
Israeli-made Skylark I, II, and III UAVs.27 The Skylark is a miniature, modular,
and autonomous UAV; it is small enough to be packed up and carried by ground
forces and deployed within minutes. The UAV is equipped with advanced communication features that allow it to pass real-time, high-resolution videos, day or
night, within a forty-kilometer radius.28 The role of the Sky Rider unit is different
from other UAV units, as its primary mission is to deliver real-time, tactical intelligence directly to junior combat officers on the battlefield.29
The innovative Zik and Sky Rider units presaged other paradigm shifts within
the IDF artillery corps. In 2014, the artillery corps created a new Detection Unit,
whose original mission was to
identify, monitor, and report on
The IDF’s missions no longer were to occupy
the trajectory of missiles and
vast adversary-state territory but, instead, to
rockets fired into and out of
gain operational control over geographically
Israel.30 The Detection Unit also
limited hostile areas and eliminate localized
collected meteorological data
threats such as missile capabilities and armsto pass on to weapons system
smuggling tunnels.
operators. The unit deployed
sensors at various altitudes using several unique platforms. These sensors collected meteorological data such as air pressure, humidity, wind, and temperature, which are critical for making accurate ballistic calculations and increasing
weapon accuracy. The data were used to improve the accuracy and effectiveness
of artillery guns, UAVs, and precision-guided missiles.31 As the artillery corps’s
tools changed, its personnel structure was reduced or reallocated significantly.
In the past decade, half the IDF reserve artillery brigades were disestablished,
their equipment was sold or scrapped, and the reservists who had served in these
brigades were released or assigned to regular infantry brigades.32 This left the IDF
with four active artillery brigades and four reserve artillery battalions.33
AIR FORCE
In the first decades of Israel’s existence and in its early military conflicts, the
Israeli Air Force (IAF) was tasked with supporting the ground forces as they
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progressed toward and captured enemy territory, and with maintaining aerial
superiority. To achieve this, the IAF operated under two guiding principles that
persist to this day, in some respects. The first principle was the element of surprise; because the IAF had limited air resources compared with the combined air
assets of the Arab alliance that Israel faced in its early years, it was vital to operational success for the IAF to strike adversaries first.34 The IAF’s second principle,
also driven by its relative size, was to concentrate its effort against a single front or
objective before moving on to the next one, rather than dividing into small task
forces to attack multiple targets simultaneously.35
The Six-Day War of 1967 illustrated the decisiveness of these principles in
practice. The war commenced with a surprise aerial attack against Egypt, focusing on its airfields and aircraft while they were still on the ground. Within five
hours, the IAF performed 347 sorties and destroyed more than three hundred
Egyptian fighter jets and eleven Egyptian military airfields.36 The IAF then carried out 125 sorties against targets in Syria and Jordan, destroying most of the
Syrian air force and severely damaging the Jordanian air force. The IAF suffered
twenty-four fatalities and lost forty-six fighter jets.37
Six years later, the IAF faced the reverse scenario. On 6 October 1973, Egypt
and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. The IAF first had to defend Israel’s
airspace; only then could it go on the offensive. The IAF also was challenged by
Egypt’s and Syria’s newly acquired, Soviet-made antiaircraft systems, which they
purchased pursuant to the lessons of the previous conflict.38 Unlike the Six-Day
War, the Yom Kippur War lasted almost three weeks, and the IAF suffered ninetytwo fatalities and lost 103 fighter jets.39
In the wake of these wars, the IAF worked to improve its aerial dogfighting
capabilities, procure new technologies to defeat Soviet antiaircraft systems, and
increase the accuracy and efficacy of its strikes against enemy targets. In 1978,
Israel purchased seventy-five Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter
jets, designed for stealth and air-to-ground attacks, and the McDonnell Douglas F-15A Eagle, designed for aerial dogfighting against adversary jets.40 These
modernizations led to improved IAF performance during the 1982 Lebanon war.
Over ninety days of operations, the IAF destroyed Syria’s Soviet-made antiaircraft
systems and shot down a hundred Syrian fighter jets, with zero losses to IAF air
forces.41
However, as Israel increasingly became engaged in low-intensity conflict
against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, and Hezbollah, the
IAF’s operational role in Israel’s military campaigns decreased. Israel’s nonstate
adversaries diminished the relevance of Israel’s air superiority by adopting guerrilla tactics. They operated in small groups; carried out low-profile operations in
unexpected locations; and used light weapons, suicide bombers, and rockets. To
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protect themselves, they moved constantly, kept strict secrecy about the locations
of their military installations, and assimilated themselves into civilian populations and infrastructure. During the first and second intifadas, the IAF made
a significant contribution to Israel’s attempt to achieve military victory but was
much less influential to the outcome than the ground forces. During the Lebanon
war of 2006, IAF operations were lethal and efficient but failed to influence the
results of the war. Over thirty-three days, the IAF executed eighteen thousand
sorties and destroyed thousands of rocket launchers and military installations.42
But throughout that period, Hezbollah continued to launch rockets into Israel,
showing Israeli military leadership that the IAF’s dominance was no longer a
guarantor of victory in battle.
Toward the end of that decade, the IAF began prioritizing precision-strike accuracy and stealth over air-to-air and air-to-ground attack capabilities. These capabilities were vital to Israel’s attempt to prevent advanced weapons systems from
reaching Hamas and Hezbollah. This allowed the IAF to conduct long-distance
air operations to carry out precision strikes far beyond Israel’s border areas, such
as in Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, while leaving no footprint or signature that
could be attributed to Israel. Perhaps the highest national priority for the IAF was
to maintain and demonstrate the ability to attack and destroy hardened nuclear
facilities by air in remote and hostile territories, as it did in 1981 against Iraq’s
Osirak reactor, and later in Syria. Following its successful strike against the Syrian
nuclear reactor in 2007, the IAF prepared for a potential attack against what were
suspected widely to be Iranian nuclear facilities.43
These sensitive strike missions had significant implications for the IAF’s force
composition and engagement. In 2015, the Israeli defense ministry procured fourteen Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter jets, which were added to nineteen
units Israel had purchased already.44 The F-35, while not suited for dogfights,
has improved stealth capabilities and can reach distant and remote targets easily,
conduct air-to-surface attacks, and even deploy some nuclear-armed missiles.45
Simultaneously, Israel also expanded its UAV arsenal and doubled its fleet of Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules aerial-refueling aircraft, expanding Israel’s
ability to attack remote targets at long distances.46 These advanced acquisitions
strained IAF budget constraints, forcing the IAF to deprioritize other capabilities.
To save money, the IAF decided to disestablish several combat squadrons, including squadrons of F-15 and F-16A/B fighters and Bell AH-1 Cobra helicopters.47
NAVY
Israel shares many of the characteristics of an island, in that it is surrounded
alternately by adversarial states or territories and the Mediterranean Sea. Israel has maritime borders with Egypt, Jordan, Hezbollah-controlled southern

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

11

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 4

JA G E R

23

Lebanon, and the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Having a small population and
limited natural resources, Israel always has been challenged to provide for its
own subsistence and, therefore, has been reliant on imports via the sea. In fact,
over the years, 98 percent of Israel’s imported goods have entered through the
Mediterranean and Red Seas.48 With over 80 percent of Israel’s population spread
across its 197 kilometers of coastline, this area is especially vulnerable to attacks.49
Moreover, much of Israel’s critical infrastructure facilities, such as power stations,
ports, military installations, communication channels, and water desalination
facilities, are located near or along Israel’s coast.
That being the case, protecting trade routes, securing Israel’s territorial waters, and guarding the coastline are the Israeli navy’s most vital missions. Israel’s
dependence on seaborne imports makes the need to maintain open sea routes
especially important during wartime. Israel’s navy was designed to engage Egypt’s
and Syria’s Soviet-backed navies, which Israeli leadership viewed as the primary
maritime threat.50 To that end, the Israeli navy procured destroyers, missile boats,
versatile patrol boats, and two submarines.51 To minimize dependence on military imports, Israeli Military Industries developed maritime weaponry such as
the Gabriel missile system, designed specifically for surface naval warfare.52
During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israeli navy defeated the Egyptian
and Syrian navies while suffering no ship or personnel losses of its own.53 As
with the ground forces, the quantitative power balance at sea seemingly tilted
heavily toward Egypt and Syria, which enjoyed significant superiority in terms
of warships and firepower. The Israeli navy had fourteen missile boats against
Egypt and Syria’s combined twenty-four missile boats. Just prior to the war, the
Israeli navy had decommissioned its two old submarines, leaving a significant
capability gap against the Egyptian navy’s twelve active submarines. Nonetheless,
the Israeli navy destroyed or captured twenty-four enemy vessels while suffering
only minimal damage and personnel casualties. Throughout the entire war, the
Israeli navy managed to keep Israel’s ports safe and most of the Mediterranean
trade routes open, which permitted a continuous flow of energy and other supplies to Israel.54 Most importantly, the Israeli navy pushed those rival navies out
of Israel’s territorial waters and ensured that no Israeli coastal city was attacked
from the sea during the conflict.55
After the 1973 war, the diminishing likelihood of a maritime battle with rival
navies and increasing tension with nonstate adversaries led the Israeli military
leadership to direct the navy to invest more resources in maritime-security
missions to prevent attacks against Israeli citizens.56 The navy decommissioned
all of its destroyers and large missile boats and began purchasing patrol boats
and small- and medium-size missile boats.57 These changes came at a price. The
navy was criticized for not making a sufficient contribution to the 2006 Lebanon
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war. Two days into the war, Hezbollah launched two C-802 antiship cruise missiles against an Israeli Sa’ar 5–class corvette, killing four members of the ship’s
crew. The Winograd commission of inquiry into the war concluded that the
navy operated in a mind-set of conducting policing operations rather than
an offensive military conflict, leading crewmembers to disregard Hezbollah’s
lethality and threat.58
In 2007, the navy took on responsibility for enforcing the blockade of the Gaza
Strip.59 The Gaza conflicts and the continuous attempts by militant groups to
infiltrate Israel via the sea or to break the blockade demanded that the navy play
this growing role in routine security operations. In 2011, the navy added another
routine security mission: the protection of Israel’s newly discovered offshore
natural gas fields.60 Between
2009 and 2012, Israel discov[B]y 2011 the IDF prioritized cyber defense
ered several gas fields with an
as the most pressing need within the
estimated 680 billion cubic
military, and new recruits who were eligible
meters of natural gas. 61 The
for combat service but also passed cyber
discovery of the gas reserves
units’ requirements were sent directly to
led Israel to begin switching
the cyber units.
its power-generation infrastructure to use natural gas,
meaning that a successful attack against those gas fields could jeopardize Israel’s
energy security.62 The navy was instructed to provide a tiered defense of Israel’s
offshore energy infrastructure, including the gas wells, platforms, and underwater pipelines.63
In 2011, Israel purchased three additional submarines from Germany, doubling its fleet to six hulls.64 While the German manufacturer was responsible
for building the submarine hulls, Israeli teams were responsible for the combat
systems and weapons that were installed on board. These included advanced
radar and communication systems, electronic warfare systems, equipment for
deploying special forces divers to infiltrate hostile areas, and the ability to launch
torpedoes and cruise missiles with conventional and unconventional warheads
and ranges up to 1,500 kilometers.65 The main catalyst for the latest submarine
purchase was Iran’s pursuit of nuclear-weapons capabilities. The IDF was instructed to prepare for two possible scenarios to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
The first was that Israel would launch an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
In this case, Israel should be able to threaten Iran with a nuclear response in case
the latter decided to retaliate with other strategic weapons. In the second scenario
Iran would develop a nuclear weapon and threaten to use it against Israel. In this
case, Israel would expand its deterrence to make sure Iran comprehended that an
attack on Israel most likely would lead to mutual destruction.66
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SPECIAL FORCES
The IDF special forces can be classified into four groups.
1. The elite units: General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal),
naval commandos (Shayetet 13), air force commandos (Shaldag), and
the Special Operations Engineering Unit (Yahalom)
2. The commando units: Egoz, Maglan, and Duvdevan
3. The reconnaissance units: Paratroopers Reconnaissance Battalion,
Golani Reconnaissance Battalion, Givati Reconnaissance Battalion,
Nahal Reconnaissance Battalion, and 401st and 7th Reconnaissance
Battalions
4. The specialized units: 669 Unit for airborne combat search and rescue,
canine unit (Oketz), 504 Unit of the Human Intelligence Division, and
Moran Unit for precision-guided missiles
Despite the profusion of special-operations units in the IDF, on only two occasions did the special forces make a significant contribution to the outcome of
a war. The first was during the Suez crisis of 1956, in which the paratroopers
were deployed behind enemy lines to the Mitla Pass in the Sinai Peninsula. The
second was during the 1967 Six-Day War, when the paratroopers again deployed
behind enemy lines to Abu-Ageila, also in the Sinai Peninsula.67 The IDF’s elite,
commando, reconnaissance, and specialized units have not affected the outcome
of any other wars decisively. In most cases, they either received small and insignificant, yet complex, missions or were annexed to an operational brigade and
fought under its command.
Following twenty-four years of low-intensity conflict in southern Lebanon,
the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, the IDF special forces’ ability to contribute
decisively to a large-scale military campaign had reached its nadir. The Winograd
Commission for the inquiry into the Lebanon war of 2006 concluded that the IDF
did not make effective use of its special forces. According to the report, special
forces were scattered across the IDF and were subordinated to various commands: “the decentralized command of the special forces damaged their ability to
constitute a significant force . . . [which explains their] limited contribution to the
greater strategic cause.” The committee went so far as to conclude that some IDF
special-forces units had been established to deal with specific operational challenges and that many of these challenges no longer existed. Pride and comradery
prevented these units from pivoting their focus or creating collaborations that
could have been relevant to large-scale conflicts.68
In 2011, as part of the lessons of the Lebanon war of 2006, the IDF established the Depth Corps.69 The core of the new command was a new Commando Brigade, which was a seminal unification of the IDF commando units.
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Historically, the IDF’s commando units all operated independently, not under
a unified command. When the new brigade was established, the three commando units—the Egoz, Maglan, and Duvdevan commandos—were extracted
from their existing organizational and command affiliations and began training and operating as a unified fighting force.70 The Commando Brigade unified these units under one centralized command, making it the most lethal
synchronized brigade in the IDF, and the most relevant force to combat Hamas
and Hezbollah.
The reconnaissance units underwent structural and doctrinal changes as well.
Each of the IDF’s reconnaissance battalions was composed of three companies:
an antitank company, a sabotage and engineering company, and a reconnaissance
company. Following the implementation of the GMYP, the missions and training
routines of these companies changed. The most significant modifications were
the focus on underground warfare and the replacement of the antitank and sabotage and engineering companies with three identical reconnaissance companies
in each of the reconnaissance battalions.71 The operational rationale for this was
that combating Israel’s new unconventional adversaries, which lacked armored
forces and infrastructure requiring specialized units to handle, demanded different capabilities from the reconnaissance units.
Elite units remained separate from the new battle groups even after the other
special-forces units were reorganized. While the GMYP reduced the size of the
IDF’s conventional combat forces, the elite units were expanded and allocated
even more training resources, and their service track was modified. Prior to the
new service track, male soldiers in the elite units were obligated to serve the same
three years as other conscripts and then were required to complete an additional
sixteen to twenty months of training before another three-year service period in
an elite unit. Soldiers identified as potential commanders during that training
period continued to Officer’s Cadet School, while the rest of the elite-unit soldiers
continued their service as noncommissioned officers.72 Following the implementation of the GMYP, the elite units introduced a new service track. Now, all
soldiers selected for the elite units would be admitted to Officer’s Cadet School
and serve for seven consecutive years.73 This change is expected to increase dramatically the size of the elite units and help the members of those units be seen
as professionals rather than conscripted troops.
IDF INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
Israeli military intelligence is divided into four core units. The signals-intelligence
(SIGINT) unit is responsible for intercepting communications and electronic
signals. The visual-intelligence (VISINT) unit is responsible for mapping hostile
areas and interpreting images from satellites and other visual resources, such

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

15

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 4

JA G E R

27

as reconnaissance photographs.74 The human-intelligence (HUMINT) unit is
responsible for recruiting and handling human assets, and related operations.75
The research unit is responsible for providing threat warnings of possible hostile
operations and indications of adversary intentions.
In the past, traditional military targets included military bases, concentrations
of forces, defense formations, dams, power stations, bridges, and other elements
of permanent infrastructure. These targets did not require precision targeting, as
they mostly were large, static, and distant from civilian populations. The intelligence process—researching, collecting, processing, analyzing, and distributing
finished products—could take months or years to complete. Over time, with
the declining likelihood of a conventional war and the rising threat of nonstate
adversaries, military intelligence’s focus shifted. Rather than identifying the capabilities and intentions of nations, military intelligence’s focus now is on monitoring the military proliferation of nonstate adversaries, detecting and alerting
on imminent threats, and developing methods to obtain and deliver intelligence
quickly.76 This shift in focus forced the IDF Intelligence Directorate to implement
new doctrinal and structural changes, as well as to introduce new capabilities to
remain relevant.
The SIGINT unit, known as 8200 Unit, responsible for intercepting communications and electronic signals, experienced tremendous growth in recent years. It
added a cyber unit that specializes in hacking and sabotaging electronic systems,
and the Hatsav Unit, which collects intelligence from social media platforms.77
The most significant addition to the SIGINT unit was the establishment of the
Operational SIGINT Battalion. Intelligence analysts belonging to this battalion
provide combat forces with real-time intelligence during operations.78 In practice, this means that intelligence analysts of the Operational SIGINT Battalion
are annexed temporarily to a field unit for specific missions or operations. They
join the field unit’s operational control center and synthesize existing information
with real-time reports from the battlefield and other sources such as drones, cameras, and wiretaps. They communicate their assessments directly to operational
forces in the field to warn them of imminent threats, verify their observations,
and support them amid the uncertainty of battle.
The VISINT unit, known as 9900 Unit, also grew significantly. In the 1990s,
the VISINT unit began expanding its intelligence-collection platforms to include
human observation and static cameras, as well as vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and,
most importantly, satellites.79 In 1988, Israel became the eighth country in the
world to launch a surveillance satellite into space independently. Israel successfully launched eight more satellites into orbit over the next three decades. The last
one, the reconnaissance satellite Ofek 11, was launched in 2016.80 The VISINT
unit was expanded to develop new techniques for producing intelligence from
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existing visual images and to cope with the constantly growing flow of visual data
coming from the new collection resources.81
The IDF Intelligence Directorate also implemented cross-organizational
changes to be more effective against nonstate adversaries and unconventional capabilities. In the past, internal groups within the research, SIGINT, VISINT, and
HUMINT units had been organized around geographic areas or particular stages
of the intelligence process. Now, for the first time, relevant sections were not
limited to working on specific
geographic areas but instead
[T]he IDF’s transformation and Israel’s
were organized to focus on
self-fortification approach to security means
organizational or ideological
that the IDF may not be properly prepared
targets, such as the Islamic
to contend with evolving complex threats
Jihad and ISIS. Other secas nonstate adversaries grow in size and
tions were organized by the
acquire rocket and missile capabilities that
type of threat, such as weaponce belonged only to states.
ons of mass destruction or
low-intensity conflict. Finally,
some units were aligned to different scopes of intelligence: national-level intelligence for the prime minister, strategic-level intelligence for the chief of general
staff, operational-level intelligence for headquarters and high commands, and
tactical-level intelligence for combat forces.82
Moving from a geographic paradigm to a capability and organizational one
necessitated additional reforms to military intelligence. Following the Arab
Spring, the IDF Intelligence Directorate recognized its failure to anticipate the severity of the uprisings and the regional instability that resulted. As a result, Major
General Kochavi, then serving as the Military Intelligence director, established
the Regional Section within the Research Department of the IDF Intelligence Directorate. The section’s purpose was to investigate and monitor economic, social,
and political developments, primarily in the Middle East, and identify potential
geopolitical shifts of strategic significance to Israel. General Kochavi also enacted
a new approach of assembling ad hoc multidisciplinary teams, subcommittees,
and provisional headquarters to address time-sensitive threats.83 Lastly, the IDF
Intelligence Directorate established a new section—the Target Section—to build
a database of targets using deep-learning algorithms and big data to take advantage of advances in developing information and analyzing trends, patterns, and
associations. The algorithms can scan billions of data points (e.g., images, videos,
audio, and electronic signals) to identify potential targets.84 Analysts then can
investigate the suggested targets, after an initial triage by the algorithms, and
confirm correct selections, which in turn improves the algorithms’ performance.
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CYBER
The IDF established its first cyber units in 2011. Initially, the Shin Bet, Israel’s
civilian internal-security service, was responsible for defending Israel’s critical
cyber infrastructure. However, the IDF had greater organizational and technical
capacity to establish and operate larger cyberoperations centers. As the cyber
threat expanded beyond the capacity of any single agency’s resources into a strategic, crosscutting dimension of war, the IDF began to prioritize cybersecurity
and took over responsibility for protecting both Israel’s security and civilian cyber infrastructures. The IDF’s cyber activities were divided between two directorates. The Intelligence Directorate was responsible for offensive cyber operations
and the collection of intelligence; the Computer and Information Technology
(IT) Directorate was responsible for protecting the military and civilian infrastructures from attacks.85 The Computer and IT Directorate then was expanded
to include a new division, the Cyber Defense Division. Subsequently, the name
of the Computer and IT Directorate was changed to the Computer, IT, and Cyber
Defense Directorate.
The Cyber Defense Division is responsible for providing defense for air, sea,
land, and cyberspace, and is the senior authority for cyber protection in the IDF.
The division protects the IDF’s communication and computing systems and its
technology-based offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, and it trains all IDF
forces in countercyber practices and operations. The Cyber Defense Division’s
primary objective is to prevent electronic information from leaking out of the
IDF, and it ensures the continuity of IDF operations without IT disruptions.86
The organizational structure of the Cyber Defense Division is unique and reflects the unit’s significance within the IDF. A brigadier general was appointed to
command the division; in the IDF, staff divisions more typically are led by colonels.87 The Cyber Defense Division also, rather than the normal three sections,
has four—operations, intelligence, technological, and electronic warfare—each
commanded by an officer at the rank of colonel.88 Finally, the Cyber Defense
Division was given a unique modular structure in which soldiers could work as
part of a large task force but also could be annexed to combat branches of the IDF
to work independently or in small teams.89
Two additional organizations were created to assist the Cyber Defense Division in implementing its policies and improving connectivity and cooperation.
The first was a cyber branch within the IDF multi-corps command headquarters,
which already had air force, armored, naval and infantry branches. The purpose
of the cyber branch was to protect offensive and defensive military capabilities
(e.g., armored personnel carriers, weapons, radars, and computing systems) from
cyber attacks. In practice, this required ensuring the safety of the entire manufacturing process and supply chain, as well as routine checks against malware.90
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The IDF also established a Cyber Situation Center to manage cyber-related
emergencies, track international trends in cyberspace, and coordinate between
the separate cyber units in the IDF.91
The establishment of these organizations and priorities for cyber defense
marked a significant cultural shift within the IDF. The Israeli military had a longstanding tradition that prioritized combat units above all others in competitions
for qualified manpower, budgets, and positions. IDF recruitment protocols dictated that new recruits were directed first to combat units, and only those who
were not assessed to be qualified for combat duty were directed to noncombat
units. But by 2011 the IDF prioritized cyber defense as the most pressing need
within the military, and new recruits who were eligible for combat service but
also passed cyber units’ requirements were sent directly to the cyber units.
Moreover, the IDF, for the first time in its short history, launched a program that
offered eligible soldiers in combat units the option to transfer to a cyber unit.92
Finally, while combat forces were experiencing a significant reduction in manpower and the IDF cut five thousand officers, the cyber units were provided with
a hundred new positions for commissioned and noncommissioned officers in
2015, in addition to ten thousand new cyber posts already allocated.93
A TRANSFORMED IDF AND
THE RISKS OF “SELF-FORTIFICATION”
At the center of Israel’s military transformation stands a new, defensive approach.
Toward the end of the 2010s, Israel’s perception of its military objectives in a
conflict changed dramatically. Israel no longer sought the total defeat of its opponents or to uproot threats; it now sought to avoid large-scale confrontations
by showing restraint, carrying out precision strikes, and building multiple layers
of sophisticated defensive infrastructure and technology to protect itself. This
defensive, rather than offensive, approach evolved into a new doctrine of “selffortification.” Instead of incorporating tactical defensive measures as part of a
larger offensive effort to combat threats, these tactical measures, often based on
groundbreaking innovations in military technology, became the principal deterrent to Israel’s nonstate adversaries.
Beyond surrounding itself with fences and concrete walls along its borders,
Israel has integrated advanced technologies to increase the effectiveness of these
physical barriers. Throughout the years, Israel’s border barriers have been fortified and equipped with day- and night-vision cameras, touch sensors, motion
detectors, and floating cameras. These measures are reinforced with military
patrols, human observers, and sand-filled areas near the fence that professional
military trackers scan for footprints. In some locations, Israel has replaced its
border fence with concrete and steel walls, particularly in places with a higher
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risk of infiltration and sniper fire. In 2017, Israel began replacing the border fence
with Lebanon, which stretches across 130 kilometers, with a nine-meter-high
concrete wall topped with another three meters of steel fencing.94
A year later, Israel began building the new Israel-Gaza barrier. The six-meterhigh barrier is made of galvanized steel and will stretch across the entire border
between Israel and the Gaza Strip at completion.95 Under the Israel-Gaza barrier,
Israel has constructed a belowground concrete wall to protect against infiltration
tunnels. The underground wall is expected to stretch across the sixty-five kilometers of the Israel-Gaza border. The barrier will consist of concrete and steel and
will penetrate the ground as deep as thirty meters.96 In 2018, Israel completed the
construction of a new sea barrier along the maritime border with the Gaza Strip.
The barrier consists of three layers—a regular breakwater, reinforced stone, and
barbed wire—all reinforced by smart fences equipped with alarm systems and
touch sensors, day- and night-vision cameras, and motion detectors.97
Israel has an active, multilayered missile-defense system arrayed against barrage threats from adversary states and militant organizations alike. This includes
the Arrow 3, Arrow 2, David’s Sling, Iron Dome, and Iron Beam—a newly developed active missile-defense system that uses concentrated laser waves to intercept
smaller objects such as mortar shells and small drones. The multilayered defense
system is under constant development and is expected to provide defense against
mortar shells; short-, medium-, and long-range surface-to-surface missiles and
rockets; medium- and long-range conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles;
and UAVs.
Colonel Yehuda Vach, commander of the Heiram regional brigade of the
Northern Command and one of the fiercest critics of Israel’s doctrine of selffortification, warns against the illusion of security that it creates: “[A] nation that
fortifies itself [with fences, barriers, and walls] is a nation that lives in fear. The
more fences we built across the borders, the more our security doctrine became
dependent on defense and self-fortification. A society that builds more and more
fences is a society that lives in fear. Logically, it might seem that fortifications
project strength but the truth is that it does not[;] if anything, it projects fear.”98
Through this lens, Israel’s doctrine of self-fortification can be perceived as a
symptom of national weakness. As Vach observed: “[T]he fighting spirit of the
military will not be reinforced by physical barriers but by its mental strength. A
nation that hides, projects mental weakness, is making it easier for the enemy
to defeat it. . . . [T]he fence creates an illusion, a false perception that [misleads
people into believing that] they are safe.”99
Major General (Ret.) Yitzhak Brick, who served as IDF chief ombudsman
and examined the operational readiness of more than a thousand military
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units during his service, is another fierce critic of the current trend in the IDF.
Brick criticized political and military leaders for shifting the IDF’s force planning toward defeating nonstate adversaries and disregarding the possibility of
a conventional war in the future. According to Brick, “the current misconception [among] the IDF military command [is] that there won’t be any more big
[conventional] wars. They do not consider the possibility that the Middle East
will change . . . that the Syrians might recover, that the Egyptians will change
their attitude, nothing. Just a small military for two arenas [the Gaza Strip and
Lebanon].”100
But Brick believes the IDF still will encounter difficulties facing nonstate adversaries, even with a self-fortification doctrine.
The next war will be a multi-front war against Hamas from Gaza, Hezbollah from
Lebanon and [at the same time we will have to deal with] missile attacks from Syria
and perhaps from Iraq. . . . [The next war] will include pounding [heavy missile barrages] of population centers in Israel by hundreds of thousands of rockets. . . . [Israel
will be] attacked by 1500–2000 missiles every day, . . . among them, missiles with
600–700 kilogram warheads. . . . [Israel] is facing a serious problem, as it is currently
incapable of blocking such [heavy, coordinated bombardment]. The air force alone
cannot do it, as we saw during the previous campaigns in Gaza. Our [anti]missile
[systems] are not developed enough to deal with such a large number of missiles.101

Senior officers in the IDF have explained that the only way to prevent massive
and destructive barrages from raining into Israel is to capture temporarily the
hostile areas from which the shelling is taking place.102 Previous military campaigns in the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon demonstrated that the air force
alone, despite its advanced antimissile capabilities, could not prevent missile
launches into Israel altogether, much less a coordinated missile attack on four
fronts. Thus, defending Israel effectively from major multiaxis barrages would
require a major military ground operation in which the IDF captures and controls launching areas in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria and, if need be, extends this
ground control as far as Iraq or Iran. Because the IDF reduced and deprioritized
its conventional fighting forces over the past decade, it is reasonable to conclude
that the IDF is not sufficiently prepared to contend with this worst-case scenario
and contemporary existential threats to Israel.
Overall, this article provides a primary analysis of recent structural changes
in the IDF at the tactical level, based on interviews with IDF soldiers, and points
to five observable trends: decreasing conventional capabilities, investing in and
developing defensive capabilities, reorientation of the practices and structure
of IDF combat forces toward guerrilla warfare, prioritizing cyber and intelligence capabilities, and expanding nuclear capabilities in the air and at sea.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

21

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 4

JA G E R

33

These trends indicate a doctrinal evolution in Israel toward prioritizing nonstate
adversaries. The rise of nonstate adversaries and the declining conventional
threat from nation-states, along with groundbreaking innovations in military
technology, drove this transformation. Israel’s shift toward a defensive security
doctrine has shaped the IDF’s force planning and readiness for war, which now
reinforce that doctrine in turn. The cementing of both the IDF’s transformation and Israel’s self-fortification approach to security means that the IDF may
not be properly prepared to contend with evolving complex threats as nonstate
adversaries grow in size and acquire rocket and missile capabilities that once
belonged only to states.
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